Why canada needs f 35

It is often forgotten that quantity is in itself an asset and too small a force could fall below a critical mass threshold. It may be argued that 5 th generation fighters such as the Russian Sukhoi T or its Chinese equivalent might, in one or two decades, if their developments are successful and their deployments practical, change the correlation of forces in the air.

Again, the likeliness of such advanced fighters reaching Canadian airspace is low. And if Canada deploys overseas, it will operate in the frame of a coalition.

Even more important, the pertinence of a limited number of F in combat against 5 th generation fighters has been widely discussed and is not yet clearly established. The recent conflict in Libya showed that 4 th generation aircraft were well suited to the task; In Libya, French Air Force Rafales proved their first-entry capacity. Over potential high-threat environments with double-digit SAMs in the Middle-East, Canadian aircraft would be part of a coalition effort where they would get backup for air-defense suppression from dedicated air assets.

The latest information available on the Air Force version of the F reveals a remarkably short range 1 km of total operational autonomy, the equivalent of a km combat radius and a very limited km maximum supercruise capability.

Even the addition of two massive external fuel tanks would hardly increase non air-refuelled operational autonomy beyond 1 km. One may also question the relevance of a single-engine aircraft over large area. Engine failure on a single-engine aircraft means the loss of the machine, whereas a twin-engine aircraft can often limp back to its base, a simple fact that has contributed to the increased proportion of twin-engine aircraft among 4 th generation fighters.

Stealthiness has a cost, which has been so far largely guessed at, but for which hard figures are beginning to emerge. Unfortunately no figures are quoted for the F, but there is little need of scientific evidence to admit the notion that the maintenance at operational standards of the delicate skin of a stealth aircraft is more expensive than a conventional one.

Ultimately, the bottom line resulting from these constraints is obviously cost as the F appears expensive to develop, purchase and, very likely, to operate. The Typhoon is optimised for the RAF long patrols over the North Sea and is an excellent air-superiority platform, but has less developed air-to-ground capabilities.

The Rafale has lower air-to-air capabilities although further radar developments and the integration of the Meteor missile will reduce the gap but is a better, combat-proven multirole fighter-bomber.

Both aircraft have similar purchase costs, probably lower operational costs, better payloads and combat radius than the F In both cases, the issue of interoperability with American fighters should not be insolvable as both aircraft are fully up to NATO standards; obviously less synergies will be generated than with a fully integrated F35 fleet.

Information available on industrial compensations and technology transfers seem attractive in all cases and does not build a convincing case for the F on an industrial basis alone. The opinions of the writers published herein do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Mackenzie Institute.

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